## United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit



**APPENDIX** 

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74-1732

## THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

Plaintiff-Appellee,

-against-

Docket No. 74-17 32

AL MARTIN,

Defendant-Appellant


## APPENDIX FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT



OZRO THADDEUS WELLS C. VERNON MASON, of Counsel 377 Broadway - Suile 1107 New York, New York 10013 (212) CA 6-3000

WALLACE GOSSETT CHARLES E. WILLIAMS III 10 Columbus Circle Suite 2030 New York, New York 10019

Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant



PAGINATION AS IN ORIGINAL COPY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

AFFIDAVIT

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10-74	AL.MARTIN- filed notice of appearance by atty: O. T. We Vernon Mason, 377 Bway, Suite L107,NYC 10013 Ca 6				
18-74	Filed affdyt of Ozro Thaddeus Wells in support of app substitution of attyAND- MEMO-END. substitution	rante	d.	for Poll	
-22-740	Filed writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum. Writ ret	1-14	-74		
/6/74	Al Martin (atty present) application for bail reduction Trial date set for 2-25-74. Pollack,J.		-		
2/25/74	Deft Al Martin (atty present) appears for suppression Suppression hearing held. Trial to begin 2/28/74.	heari	hg.		
2/26/74	Trial begun. with jury.  A TRUE COPY RAYMOND F. BURG	HARDT,	Cler	·k	
2/27/74	Trial cont'd.  By Lac	Depa	ty C	lerk	
2/28/74	Trial cont'd & concluded. Jury deliberation.				
3/1/74	Deliberations cont'd and concluded. Deft found guilty P.S.R. ordered. sent. date 3/28/74 at 10AM. Deft r	as c emand	hare ed.	Pol	
3/18/74	Filed deft Al Martin's notice of motion for judgment of notwithstanding the verdict, or in the alternative new trial.	100,			
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3/28/74	imprisonment for a period of FIFTEEN (15) YEARS.  \$50,000. Pending Appeal. Pollack, J. Fr.  3/29/74 Issued copies.		nt.	3/29	

SOUTHERN DUSTRICT OF HEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

-v-

AL MARTIN and JOHN DOE,

INDICTIENT

73 Cr.

Defendants.

The Grand Jury charges:

On or about the 16th day of August, 1972, in the Southern District of New York, AL MARTIN and JOHN DOE, the defendants, and others to the Grand Jury known and unknown, by force and violence and by intimidation, did take and attempt to take from the person and presence of another, money and property in the amount of approximately \$4,553.05 belonging to and in the care, custody, control, management and possession of the Chase Manhattan Bank, 2065 Second Avenue, New York, New York, a bank the deposits of which were then insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.

(Title 18, United States Code, Sections 2113(a) and 2.)

United States Attorney

A TRUE COPY RAYMOND F. BUBGHANDT .. GLORA

1-335-18 nev. 2/4/66 DO 112 41 UNITE STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTH AN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK UNITED STATES OF AMERICA -v-AL MARTIN TO: JOHN LIVINGSTON, Clerk United States District Court Southern District of New York SIR : You are hereby notified that I appear for AL MARTIN the defendant in the above-entitled action. Dated: New York, New York Attorney for Defendant 4-00 MADES AUGUC CORY RECEIVED NG YOLK, NG YOLK Telephone Numbers

AFFIDAVIT FOR W/H/C AD TESTIFICANDUM 1.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

AFFIDAVIT 73 Cr. 814

AL MARTIN.

Defendant.

STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF NEW YORK

ss.: SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK )

BART M. SCHWARTZ, being duly sworn, deposes and says that he is an Assistant United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York; that he has charge of the prosecution of the above entitled matter; that one John Witherspoon now incarcerated at Danbury Federal Penitentiary, Danbury, Connecticut, serving a sentence which will terminate in 1988 for violation of federal law (bank robbery) is to beinterviewed to determine whether or not he has information which will be material and necessary to present to this Court upon the trial of the above named case; that the case is now on the calendar of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York for January 18, 1974.

WHEREFORE, your deponent respectfully prays that a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum issue directing the Warden, Danbury Federal Penitentiary and the United States Marshal for the Southern District of New York and the District of Connecticut to produce him in this Court on January 15, 1974.

Assistant United States Aftorney

Sworn to before me this //day of January, 1974.

Notary Public Acts or How York

Notary Public Acts or How York

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Commission explace March 31, 1675

6-BA-5

USA-33s-187 Rev. 2/4/66 COPY RECEIVED UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 1011 10 1974 SOLDIST, OF W. Z. CURRAII UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO: RAYMOND F. BURGHARDT, Clerk United States District Court Southern District of New York SIR : You are hereby notified that I appear for MACIIN the defendant in the above-entitled action. Jonvary 10, 1974 Dated: New York, New York O. TWELLS of CECSI VERNED / Attorney for Defendant 377 Beadowny Sura killer no your you 10013

Telephone Numbers

Wells & Brown Attorneys and Counselors at Law OZRO THADDEUS WELLS R. FRANKLIN BROWN AROLD F. GOLDWASSER NATA CONCENSION AND AND ASSESSED ASSESS Honorable Millon Pollack United States District Judge United States Courthouse Foley Square

377 Broadway, New York. N. 9. 10013 (212) Canal 6-3000

January 17, 1974

New York, N.Y. 10007

Re: The United States of America v. Al Martin 73 Cr. 814 (Mi)

Dear Judge Pollack:

Please consider this letter as a renewed application to substitute Mr. Lawrence Levine as attorney of record for Al Martin, the defendant above-indicated.

I am enclosing my affidavit in support of this application and in support of another application, submitted concomitantly, to adjourn the case to 25 February 1974.

I have conferred with Mr. Levine regarding the substitution and he informed me that he agrees to same.

I have stated in the affidavit aforementioned that I shall be available to represent Mr. Martin on 25 February 1974 until the case is conclude

Thank you for your attention and your consideration of my applications.

Haddens Wells

OTW:dcs

Michael B. Mukasey, Esq. Bart M. Schwartz, Esq. Lawrence Levine, Esq.

the substitution and joins in the request for the adjournment to

25 February 1974.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

MEMO ENDORSED

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

-against-

AFFIDA VIT

AL MARTIN.


73 Cr. 814 (MP)

Defendant.

STATE OF NEW YORK

: ss .:

COUNTY OF NEW YORK



OZRO THADDEUS WELLS, being duly sworn, deposes and says:

I am an altorney at law duly admitted to practice in the State of

New York and before the Supreme Court of the United States.

This affidavit is submitted in support of my application to substitute Lawrence Levine, Esq. as attorney for the above-named defendant in the matter now pending before this Court.

The case herein has been scheduled for trial for Friday,

18 January 1974. Unfortunately, this trial date conflicts with my current schedule, in that I am actually engaged in trial in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of New York, Part 45 in the matter of People v. Carlos Burgos.

I am respectfully requesting that the case herein be rescheduted for 25 February 1974 which will give me sufficient time to arrange my trial schedule to be available to represent Mr. Martin, the arrange dant herein, on the requested adjourned date without conflicts or interruptions.

Mr. Martin, the defendant herein, has been personally consulted by a representative from my office and Mr. Martin consents to the substitution and joins in the request for the adjournment to 25 February 1971.

WHEREFORE, your deponent respectfully requests that this Court accept the substitution and adjourn the case to the date requested.

Respectfully submilled

OZE THADDEUS WELLS

Sworn to before me this 17th day of January, 1974

Nolary Public

O MA C. STEWARF, Mistary Public Missing the 21-9190215 Missing the 21-9190215 Missing the County Exception to Expude therein 30, 1974

No. 73 Cr 614 DIP OF 1

MAI 28 1870

AL MARTIN

, 19 74 came the attorney for the day of March On this government and the defendant appeared in person and by O.T. Wells, Esq.

It Is ADJUDGED that the defendant upon his plea of not guilty and a verdict of guilty by a jury,

has been convicted of the offense of by force and violence and intimidation, did take and attempt to take from the person of another money and property belonging to and in the care of the Chase Manhattan Bank, a bank the deposits of which were then insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.

(Title 18, U.S. Code, Sections 2113 (a) and 2)

as charged3

and the court having asked the defendant whether he has anything to say why judgment should not be pronounced, and no sufficient cause to the contrary being shown or appearing to the Court,

It Is Adjudged that the defendant is guilty as charged and convicted.

IT IS ADJUDGED that the defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the Attorney General or his authorized representative for imprisonment for a period of FIFTEEN (15) YEARS,

Bail is Fixed at \$50,000.00 Pending Appeal.

IT:IS:AUXUBGED: that?

IT IS ORDERED that the Clerk deliver a certified copy of this judgment and commitment to the United States Marshal or other qualified officer and that the copy serve as the commitment of the Muton herack defendant.

Thex Court we community commitment to

United States District Judge.

Unsert "by [name of counsel], counsel" or without counsel; the court advised the defendant of his rights to counsel and asked him whether he desired to have counsel appointed by the court, and the defendant thereupon stated that he waived the right to the assistance of counsel." Insert (1) "cuilty and the court being satisfied there is a factual basis for the plea." (2) "not guilty, and a verdict of guilty." (3) "not guilty, and a finding of guilty," or (4) "nolo contendere," as the case may be. Insert "in count(s) number "if required 4Enter (1) sentence or sentences, specifying counts if any; (2) whether sentences are to run concurrently or consecutively and, if consecutively, when each term is to begin with reference to termination of preceding term or to any other outstanding unserved sentence: (3) whether defendant is to be further imprisoned until payment of the fine or fine and costs, or until he is otherwise discharged as provided by law. Enter any order with respect to suspension and probation. "For use of Court to recommend a particular institution.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

-against-

AL MARTIN.

NOTICE OF MOTION FOR JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR A NEW TRIAL

73 CR. 814

Defendant,

SIRS:

affidavit of OZRO THADDEUS WELLS, and upon all the proceedings had herein, that the undersigned will move this Court before the Honorable MILTON POLLACK at the United States Courthouse, located at Foley Square, Borough of Manhattan, City of New York, on the bay of MACCH 1974, at 10:30 o'clock in the forenoon of that day or as soon thereafter as counsel can be heard, to set aside the verdict of guilty returned against AL MARTIN, the defendant herein, on 1 March 1974, and that the Court order the entry of judgment of acquittal of any offense charged in the indictment against the defendant AL MARTIN in accordance with the motion and supplementary motion for judgment of acquittal made by the defendant AL MARTIN at the close of all the evidence.

In the alternative, the defendant will move that the Court set aside the verdict of guilty returned against him and grant him a new trial for the following reasons:

- 1. The verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence.
- 2. The verdict is not supported by substantial evidence.
- The Court erred in denying the defendant's motion for acquittal made at the conclusion of the evidence.

- 4. The Court erred in allowing the Assistant United States
  Attorney to introduce evidence of other crimes not
  included in the indictment since it was not related to or
  under the indictment at issue, and its introduction into
  evidence so tainted the proceedings as to permit the jury
  to draw unfair and prejudicial inferences.
- As a matter of law there was reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt.
- 6. The Court erred in its charges to the jury that considerable time and money would be wasted if they did not reach a verdict and that the case would be retried after the jury had deliberated for a lengthy period of time but failed to reach a verdict.

Yours, etc.,

OZRO THADDEUS WELLS, ESQ. C. VERNON MASON, of Counsel Attorneys for Al Martin 377 Broadway - Suite 1107 New York, New York 10013 (212) CA 6-3000

TO: HONORABLE MILTON POLLACK
United States District Judge
Southern District of New York
United States Courthouse
Foley Square
New York, New York 10007

PAUL J. CURRAN
United States Attorney for the
Southern District of New York
Attorney for the United States of
America
Attention: Michael B. Mukasey
Assistant U.S. Attorney
U.S. Attorney's Office
U.S. Courthouse

Foley Square New York, New York 10007

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR JUDGMENT OF -against-ACQUITTAL NOTWITHSTAND ING THE VERDICT, OR IN AL MARTIN, THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR A NEW TRIAL Defendant. 73 CR. 814 STATE OF NEW YORK :ss. : COUNTY OF NEW YORK OZRO THADDEUS WELLS, being duly sworn, deposes and says: 1. I am the attorney for the defendant AL MARTIN, and respectfully submit this affidavit in support of his motion for judgment of acquittal. 2. On 1 March 1974, the defendant AL MARTIN was convicted of bank robbery. 3. That this verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence and was not supported by substantial evidence. That the rulings of the Court some of which are enumerated in the Notice of Motion herein were in error and denied the defendant's right to a fair trial. WHEREFORE, your deponent most respectfully the relief sought herein be, in all respects, granted THADDEUS Sworn to before me this 71 day of March, 1974 DYANA C. STEWART ! Cont.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

-against-

Indictment

NOTICE OF APPEAL

AL MARTIN,

73 CR. 814 Mp

Desendant.

NAME AND ADDRESS OF APPELLANT:

Albert Martin, presently confined at the Federal House

Detention for Men, 427 West Street, New York City.

NAME AND ADDRESS OF APPELLANT'S ATTORNEY:

Ozro Thaddeus Welis, Esq., 377 Broadway, New York, N. Y. 10013
OFFENSE:

Violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 2113 (a) and 2.

Appellant appeals from the judgment of conviction rendered against him on the 28th day of March, 1974, wherein he was sentenced to imprisonment for a term of fifteen (15) years.

The above-named appellant hereby appeals to the United States

Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and from each and every part and
the whole thereof does the appellant appeal.

Dated; New York, New York April 4, 1974

Yours, elc.

OZRO THADDEUS WELLS
Allorney for Defendant-Appellant

377 Broadway - Suite 1107-New York, N. Y. 10013

(212) CA 6-3000

STO:

Hon. Paul J. Curran United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York U.S. Courthouse Fotey Square New York, N.Y. 10007

A-13

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U. S. A.	CASE NO. 13 CR 814
-0-	· JUDGE POLLOCIC
	CLERK'S CERTIFICATE.
AL MARTIN RES AL	
I, RAYMOND F. BURGHARDT, Clerk of the Dis	strict Court of the United States
for the Southern District of New York, do here	eby certify that the certified
capy of docket entries lettered A- 6, and	the criginal filed papers
numbered 1 thru 9, inclusive, constitut	te the record on appeal in the
above entitled proceeding; except for the follower	lowing missing drauments:
DATE FILED BRIEF !	DESCRIPTION
-22-74 FILEO	WRITH HABERS CUR.
Res ;	-PUS-
	$\rightarrow$
	<u>—</u> — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —
IN TESTIMONY WHERETY I have caused the se	as of the said Court to be
hereunto affixed, at the City of New York, in	
York, this 9 day of Arric,	in the year of our Lord One
thousand nine hundred and seventy fill,	and of the Orderendence of the
United States the 198 year.	
Vac	Clerk of the Court.

MAY 2 3 1974

minutes.

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THE COURT: We'll stand in recess for five

(Recess.)

(In open court, jury present.)

THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, I am going to give you my instructions on the law. They should be relatively brief, then the marshals will take you out to lunch at the government's expense, and when you return, you will begin your deliberations.

Members of the jury, it's the Court's function to instruct you with respect to matters of law. It's your duty as jurors to follow those instructions. It's your exclusive function to determine the facts in this case. You are the sole judges of the facts, not counsel, not I.

In considering the testimony that you have heard in this case, you may not draw any inferences from an unanswered question nor consider testimony which has been stricken from the record. The law requires that your decision be made solely upon the competent evidence before you, the evidence which the Court has allowed.

Furthermore, you must not infer from my rulings or anything I have said during the trial that I  $\Lambda - I G$ 

...

hold any views for or against any party.

The resolution of the facts of this case is entirely your function.

Before the particular charge in this case is discussed, there are some general principles you should bear in mind. The defendant has pleaded not guilty. An indictment is an accusation designed to bring an accused to Court. It's not the function of a Grand Jury to determine guilt or innocence. It passes only on probable cause to believe that the defendant is implicated.

The trial jury, yourselves, alone, are to decide whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty.

You are to give no weight to the fact of the indictment.

The defendant comes before you clothed by
the law with a presumption of innocence in his favor.

Coming here for trial, he is presumed to be innocent
and that presumption of innocence continues right through
the trial and exists now and accompanies you into the jury
room.

That presumption is always there, and the only way it can be destroyed is, by all twelve of you agreeing on the basis of evidence that the defendant's guilt was established.

If the evidence which you accept and believe

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SOUTHERN DISTRICT COURT REPORTERS U.S. COURTHOUSE

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convinces you beyond a reasonable doubt that the presumption must be discarded and a verdict of guilty returned, then the presumption is destroyed. The burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on every essential element of the charges lies with the prosecution and continues throughout the trial. No duty or burden rests on the defendant to prove his innocence. Only if this burden is fairly met by the prosecution can the defendant be convicted.

If having heard all of the evidence and applying to it the directions and rulings of law on which I am instructing you you have a reasonable doubt that this defendant is guilty of the offense with which he stands charged, then you must acquit him.

This rule does not mean that the prosecution must show that the defendant is guilty beyond all doubt, nor to an absolute certainty. The rule does not mean that you can rely on a doubt that is just capricbus. Neither does it mean a doubt formed of a reluctance of a juror to perform an unpleasant duty, or arising out of sympathy for a defendant, nor is such a doubt, a mere guess or a surmise.

Speculative notions or possibilities resting on mere conjecture not arising or deducible from the proof

should not be confounded with a reasonable doubt. A doubt suggested by the ingenuity of counsel or by your own ingenuity not legitimately warranted by the evidence or want of it, or one born of a merciful inclination to permit a defendant to escape the penalty of the law or one prompted by sympathy for him or those connected with him, is not what is meant by reasonable doubt.

If after you carefully consider the evidence you have a settled belief or conviction in your minds such as would induce a prudent person to act without hesitation in a matter of importance to himself or herself, then you may say you have been convinced beyond a reasonable doubt.

If, however, your mind is wavering or uncertain to the point that you have a doubt that would cause a prudent person to hesitate in a matter of importance and before acting, then you have not been convinced beyond a reasonable doubt and you should acquit.

You have heard reference to stipulations that were entered into by the attorneys for each side in this matter. This means that both sides agree that you shall accept the stipulated facts as undisputed.

In determining the facts, you are going to have to rely upon your own common sense and general

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SOUTHERN DISTRICT COURT REPORTEDS HE COMME

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experience in evaluating the evidence. It was a short trial. I am not going to go into the detailed evidence for you. You have heard what each of the lawyers contends was shown by the evidence or the lack of evidence.

If you have any doubt about what was said from the witness stand, you could send a note in through Mrs. Patterson who will act as your foreman. She is the lady who sits in seat number one. We'll try to find what t you want read to you, but remember, it takes a little time to get it, so try to fix what you want, if you want anything with particularity and as precisely as possible.

I will use the phrase during the course of this charge, willfully and knowingly, because the charge against the defendant requires that this element be present.

A person does not knowingly do an act if his actions resulted from mistake or negligence or other innocent reason. On the other hand, an act is willful if the defendant acts voluntarily and intentionally and with a specific intent to do something that the law forbids. That is to say, with a bad purpose to either disregard or disobey the law.

The law involved here is one that I will tell you about in a moment.

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The state of mind of the defendant is going to have to be inferred from the evidence as you heard it from the witness stand, because you can't look into a person's head, assuming there were these people in the bank which is, of course, the crucial matter for you to determine.

The charge in the indictment which brought the defendant to Court is as follows:

"On or about the 16th day of August, 1972, in the Southern District of New York, Al Martin and John Doe, the defendants, and others to the Grand Jury known and unknown, by force and violence and by intimidation did take and attempted to take from the person of another, money and property in the amount of \$4,553.05, belonging to and in the care, custody, control, management and possession of the Chase Manhattan Bank, 2065 Second Avenue, New York, New York, a bank, deposits of which were then insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation."

If the charges in that indictment are true, that would constitute a violation of the United States Code, and that code reads as follows, and I am going to quote the statute to you:

"Whoever by force and violence or by intimidation attempts to take from the person or presence of another any property or money or any other thing of value belonging

to or in the care, custody, control, management or possession of any bank, shall be guilty of a felony."

If you analyze that statute, you will see that the government has to prove four elements with respect to has this charge. Each/cs be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

First, that the defendant took money from the bank.

You will recall the testimony of the tellers and of the persons allegedly present in the bank reciting their versions of the events on the day in question and of the witness, Charles Johnson, who testified he was with John Witherspoon and Al Martin on August 14th to plan a robbery and participated with them in robbing this bank on August 16th.

With regard to the \$4,553.05 mentioned in the indictment, it's only necessary that the government prove that more than ne hundred dollars was stolen. They need not prove the exact amount stated, but you recall that the attorneys nonetheless stipulated to the larger amount, stipulated that if a witness were called, he would testify that that was the amount that the bank lost, or had missing.

The second thing that has to be shown, that such money was taken from the person and presence of others

when it was in the care, custody, control or possession of the bank, and it has been stipulated that this was a bank within the meaning of the statute, a bank whose deposits are federally insured.

Third, that the money was taken by force and violence and intimidation.

Force and violence means physical force unlawfully exercised.

Intimidation means putting in fear, but the fear must come from the conduct of the accused that is objective and such as would cause a reasonable person to be in fear of bodily harm rather than such fear as would be generated from a mere tempermental nature.

Finally, and fourth, these acts have to be done knowingly and willfully, and I have already explained to you what those words mean.

The government also relies on the so-called aiding and abetting statute, which is also included in the charges in the indictment. That statute which is known as Title 18 of the United States Code, Section 2, reads as follows:

"Whoever commits an offense against the United States, or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.

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SOUTHERN DISTRICT CO. D. ....

Whoever willfully causes an act to be done whether directly performed by him or another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a principal."

That is the statute. It's not necessary then for the government to show that the defendant personally committed the crime himself, rather, a person who aids and abets another to commit an offense is just, as guilty of that offense as if he committed it himself.

Accordingly, you may find the defendant guilty of the offense charged if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that Charles Johnson or John Witherspoon committed the offense and that the defendant Al Martin aided and abetted him or either of them.

To determine whether a defendant aided and abetted the commission of an offense, you ask yourself these questions:

Did he associate himself with the venture?

Did he participate in something he wished to bring about?

Did he seek by his actions to make it succeed? If ha did, then he is an aider and abettor.

The law recognizes two types of evidence, direct and circumstantial, either of which may be

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SOUTHERN DISTRICT COURT PERCETERS US COURTURE

sufficient to convict providing the jury is convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt.

Direct evidence, of course, is evidence from a witness who was present at a conversation or the commission of an act and testifies as to what he or she saw or heard or discovered; what he or she knows of his own knowledge, something which comes to him or her by virtue of his or her senses.

In this case, the government has also offered circumstantial evidence on the basis of which it asks that you draw certain inferences. Circumstantial evidence is, I believe as most of you know, evidence that tends to prove a disputed fact by proof of other facts which have a logical tendency to lead one's mind to conclude that the fact in issue exists.

Let me give you an example which is commonly used in cases.

Suppose when you came in this morning as you left the outdoors, the sunwas shining and bright and it looked as if we were going to have a pleasant day and when you arrived in this courtroom the blinds were drawn so you couldn't look outdoors and as you were sitting here a couple of hours later, in walked someone with a raincoat that was dripping, and an umbrella that was wet and with

rubbers and shaking off water from his hat. You haven't seen any rain. You don't know what is happening outside, but from the fact that a person came in with the raincoat, the umbrella and the dripping water, from that fact, that would be a circumstance from which you could infer the further fact, that what you couldn't see outside was that it was raining, and you would be entitled to infer from that that it was raining.

Circumstantial evidence may be considered by you and should not be given any less weight because it is circumstantial rather than direct.

That type of evidence need not exclude every possible innocent explanation and you are not limited to drawing only those inferences from it that are most favorable to a defendant.

In addition to the testimony you heard from the witnesses, exhibits were introduced and they too constitute evidence to be considered by you. It's for you and for you alone to decide what these exhibits are in fact and what they mean and what they say if anything, and what their connection may be with the issues to be decided.

In brief, the government contends that its proof which includes the exhibits, shows beyond a reasonable

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doubt that the defendant was one of the men who allegedly robbed the bank at about 9:00 in the morning on August 16, 1972.

The defendant has denied complicity here.

He pleaded not guilty and his counsel relies on the

defendant's presumption of innocence and contends that

in all events, the government has not proved beyond a

reasonable doubt that he was one of the alleged robbers.

You must decide what the facts are and if the defendant was connected with the robbery of the bank on the basis of the direct and circumstantial evidence before you.

You are privileged to request the exhibits be sent in to you so you could inspect them at close range if you want them, if you want to see them.

My reference to the exhibits and to any aspect of the testimony are not to control your own determination and view of the facts nor are you to be influenced in any way by my description or the manner of it.

In short, it's your responsibility alone to find the facts and no statement of mine or of counselis binding on you in resolving what the facts are.

Some additional rules of law for your guidance are as follows:

An accomplice is a person who voluntarily participates in the commission or the planning of a crime. Charles Johnson is a self-admitted alleged accomplice in the alleged bank robbery. The government must frequently use testimony of alleged participants to bring out the alleged facts. An accomplice is one who unites with another person in the commission of a crime voluntarily and with common intent.

Testimony of an alleged accomplice should be closely examined and weighed with great care. The fact that a witness is an accomplice may be considered by you as bearing upon his credibility. However, it does not follow that because a person has acknowledged participation in a crime charged against the defendant, the alleged accomplice is not capable of giving a truthful version of what occurred.

The law in the federal courts is that if the jury believes the implicating testimony of an accomplice to be true beyond a reasonable doubt, that testimony is sufficient to convict the defendant even though it may not be corroborated or supported by any other evidence.

The government contends that it has provided ample corroboration and support for Johnson's testimony, as well as independent evidence of Martin's

presence in connection with the alleged crime in the form of witnesses, exhibits and circumstances.

The defendant argues to the contrary. If after a cautious and careful examination of the testimony of an accomplice and his demeanor on the witness stand you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that he told the truth as to the events and participants therein which he described, there is no reason why you should not accept it as credible and act upon it accordingly.

Evidence that any witness has been convicted in the past of criminal conduct may be considered by you in determining his credibility by which is meant, his worthiness of belief.

A conviction does not make a person necessarily unworthy of belief, but it will be one of the facts which will help you decide whether to believe him and how far.

Such evidence is presented solely to aid you in considering his believability. A prior conviction will not decide this for you in and of itself.

It's your duty to determine the credibility of the witnesses whom you have heard and weigh their testimony. In weighing their testimony, you may consider the witnesses' interest in the outcome of the case, if any, their manner while testifying, their candor and intelligence

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as you have observed them, the extent to which they have been corroborated or contradicted by other credible evidence, inconsistencies within their own testimony and whether they have changed their testimony. Not every contradiction in testimony is necessarily intentionally false testimony. However, if you believe that a witness has willfully sworn falsely before you with respect to a material element of the case, you are privileged to disregard the whole or any part of his or her testimony.

You may accept what if anything you believe, and disregard what you find to be false.

Your recollection of the evidence governs.

The defendant did not testify on his own behalf and our law says a defendant may or may not take the stand. The failure to testify cannot be considered by you as evidence against him, or form a basis for any presumption or inference unfavorable to him. A defendant is not required to establish his innocence.

If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant fled or concealed himself, or disguised his
appearance immediately after it was discovered that a
crime was committed in order to avoid subsequent identification and apprehension by law enforcement officers who
might be seeking him in connection with his alleged conduct,

such fact may be considered as evidence of guilty consciousness pertaining to the charges against him relevant only on the issue of knowledge and intent.

Whether or not evidence, if you find any, of flight or change of appearances shows a consciousness of guilt and the significance if any to be attached to such circumstances, are matters for your determination.

The flight or change of appearance of a defendant does not create a presumption of guilt, but is merely a fact to be considered by you together with all the other facts and circumstances in determining whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty.

Members of the jury, under your oath as jurors, you cannot allow consideration of the punishment which might be inflicted upon a defendant if convicted to influence your verdict in any way. That is not your responsibility. The duty of imposing sentence rests exclusively upon the Court. That is solely the Judge's responsibility. Your function is to weigh the evidence in the case and determine the facts upon the basis of the evidence under the rules of law.

You are entitled to your opinions, but you should exchange views with your fellow jurors and listen carefully to cach other. While you should not hesitate or be embarrassed to change your opinion if you are convinced southern district court affortiers us countriouse

that another opinion is correct, your decision must be your own. Your verdict to be accepted must be unanimous.

Ladies and gentlemen, use your common sense in evaluating the evidence, the circumstances and the probabilities. Do not allow yourselves to be swayed or carried away or inflamed by appeals to passion, sympathy or prejudice. Suspicion and conjecture should not be substituted for proof. You must maintain a calm, clear view of the case and not be sidetracked by anybody from a fair, dispassionate consideration of the evidence in arriving at your determining of the facts.

I have completed my instructions and I
will not take a moment to talk to the lawyers at the
side bar who may wish to call to my attention something
I may have overlooked, or as to which I may have misspoken.

(At the side bar.)

THE COURT: Are there any exceptions or requests on the part of the government?

MR. MUKASEY: There was something I am not certain of. I heard your Honor mention willfully and knowingly but I am not sure I heard it defined.

THE COURT: Yes, I did define it.

MR. WELLS: I have no requests. Just, I want to raise a question with the Court on two areas.

Number one, circumstantial evidence. It's my recollection that as far as the government's case and trying to establish the robbery of the bank, that no circumstantial evidence was presented and that the only circumstantial evidence that can be inferred was the incident of the 25th of August on the Drive and the subsequent events and it's my interpretation of that that an individual could have been in the car and could have taken flight and still not have been involved in the robbery of the 16th and I believe it would be somewhat confusing if that they were to consider that as a circumstantial evidence, that if he were in effect in the car, that for them to impute that he was also—as far as the incident of the 16th in the bank.

MR. MUKASEY: I simply wanted to point out two things. First, there was circumstantial evidence relating to what was shown and not shown in those photographs.

Mr. Wells himself introduced an exhibit that re-introduces the Pecorora credit card which mentions in that paragraph three that he read that that credit card was recovered from Ruby Lee and I did not mention that in my summation but as far as I am concerned that is back in the case and third is the element of flight, all of which are circumstantial evidence.

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THE COURT: Suffice it to say for present purposes, that since I have not delivered any charge on the facts, I have merely given the jury understanding of what the difference is between direct and circumstantial evidence and it's for them to resolve the issues of fact.

What is your other point?

MR. WELLS: Your Honor, in describing the accomplice testimony made the statement, I believe, that--I hope I am quoting the Court correctly, the Court stated that the government on occasion must use accomplice testimony in order to establish the fact which gives the import that without the accomplice testimony, they would not establish the fact.

THE COURT: The exact phraseology was, that the government must frequently use testimony of alleged participants to bring out the alleged facts, so I didn't charge them as you indicated.

(In open court.)

THE COURT: There were no further matters on which I am required to instruct you. In view of the fact that the matter has reached its conclusion and that we have a full complement of jurors available to determine the case, it becomes my privilege and duty to



